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 ―Now the problem is to find a basis of union on which all these sections who 
owe allegiance to one or other conception of socialism may unite. My position is 
that this union, or rapprochement, cannot be arrived at by discussing our 
differences. Let us rather find out and unite upon the things upon which we agree. 
Once we get together, we will find that our differences are not so insuperable as 
they appear whilst we are separated… As each section has complete confidence 
in their own doctrines, let them show their confidence by entering an organization 
with those who differ from them in methods, and depend upon the development 
of events to prove the correctness of their position.‖ – James Connolly (1909) 
 
 
In the May 2011 edition of this journal, Curry Malott contributed an essay 
review of Jean Anyon‘s Marx and Education (2011). I would summarize Mallot‘s 
critiques of her book as follows: (1) she didn‘t write the book that he wanted her to 
write, (2) she didn‘t cite the authors that he wanted her to cite, and (3) her work is 
anti-Marxist because her take on the literature isn‘t identical to his. While his 
intention was to expose her book as undermining Marxist analysis even as she sought 
to support it, Malott‘s essay is actually more successful as an example of the dangers 
of sectarianism and of the tendency on the Left to purge those viewed as not 
sufficiently conforming to orthodoxy in their positions. By examining the problems in 
his essay I hope to provide a cautionary tale that may encourage Malott, and others, to 
remember the praxis in revolution. 
While some of Malott‘s(2011) criticisms of Marx and Education (Anyon, 
2011) merit consideration, at least as drawing attention to the need for greater clarity 
of language and position, they tend towards gross overstatements of the significance 
of any errors she may have made. This overreaching seems to occurs primarily 
because he draws conclusions as to the meaning and implications of written 
statements in the book that are not reasonable given what Anyon actually wrote, 
misrepresents the positions of various critical scholars in the effort to support his 
arguments, and makes arguments and reaches conclusions that are not logical or 
consistent. More troubling than this, however, is that Malott leaves the impression 
that he believes there is some sort of unified vanguard of Marxist educational 
scholars, consisting of himself and others who read Marx correctly, and claims the 
right to cast out as enemies of Marxism anyone who might deviate from their views. I 
will now turn to an examination of these problems. 
 
Write What We Want You to Write 
As I noted in my early review of Marx and Education (McGrew, 2011), 
Anyon was tasked by the book series editor with the unusual and challenging task of 
describing the trajectory of her career—of primary interest to other critical scholars—
while simultaneously providing a brief introduction to Marxism for a mixed audience. 
As she put it, she was asked to trace the ―trajectory of my scholarly work over the 
years as an example of how Marx has been used as a guide to educational analysis‖ 
(Anyon, 2011, p. 4). Anyon has written a book that does exactly what she said it 
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would do. It serves to wet the appetite of readers who are new to Marxist analysis to 
engage in a more thorough reading of Marx. That it does not do what Malott (2011) 
would have done is of little importance. If her book, rather than being titled Marx and 
Education, had been titled The Marxist Influence on the Scholarship and Career of 
Jean Anyon with a Brief Introduction to Several Basic Marxist Concepts, she might 
not have attracted Malott‘s ire. By calling her book Marx and Education she has 
encroached on turf that Malott and others claim for themselves. 
Because Anyon (2011) did not write the book that Malott (2011) wanted her to 
write, she also did not include in the book what he wanted her to include. Though 
Malott acknowledges that the book was not meant to be comprehensive (p. 5), he 
repeatedly criticizes her for not being as comprehensive as he‘d like. He also ignores 
the stated purposes and audiences for which the book was written. For example, he 
states that Anyon claimed to be documenting ―Marx and education‖ (p. 4), though she 
never claimed to be writing a book on what Marx wrote about education. Similarly, he 
complains that ―the history she outlines is not the history of Marxism‖ (p. 4) when she 
was not writing a history of Marxism but rather of her own career as influenced by 
Marx.  
Malott (2011) claims that if the ―Marxist points of view‖ not included are 
considered that the whole framework of the book ―quickly loses credibility‖ (p. 6). I 
find no support in his essay for this dismissal of the entire book. Instead of providing 
the support needed for such a bold claim, he tends to simply state what ―she should 
have said‖ (p. 6) and written about (p. 9). For example, Malott complains of what he 
alleges to be her ―uncritical use‖ of the term ―American Dream‖ (p. 11) and the 
―missed opportunity‖ to discuss how ―from a critical indigenous point of view, the 
American Dream has always been a nightmare‖ (p. 11). Here is the passage in Marx 
and Education (Anyon, 2011) that Malott is referring to: 
 
My generation came of age in the rebellious 1960s, and that may be one 
reason that as academics many of us were attracted to a theory that 
challenged what we had been taught about U.S. society. Rather than focusing 
on meritocracy, democracy, and patriotism, as our school books had taught 
us, we focused on what seemed to us structural inequalities – and what we 
saw as systematic means by which whole groups and cultures (e.g., workers, 
African Americans, women) were excluded from the American Dream. (p. 
19) 
 
When we consider what Anyon actually wrote in the passage we find no evidence of 
an uncritical use of the term or of her having somehow endorsed the capitalist 
―American Dream.‖ Though Anyon could be faulted for not including Native 
Americans and other groups in her list of those excluded, she should not be criticized 
for not providing the account that he wanted to see; of the oppression of indigenous 
populations being related to primitive accumulation (Malott, 2011, p. 11). That Anyon 
did not include in Marx and Education (2011) everything that she could have 
included—if she were writing a longer and more advanced text—or everything Malott 
wanted her to include is of little importance. It should be noted that Malott himself 
fails to mention a range of Marxist concepts, some of which are discussed by Anyon 
(2011).
4
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 I provide a guide organized by author to a number of Marxist concepts in McGrew, 2011. 
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Cite Whom We Want You to Cite 
Not only did Anyon(2011) not write the book that Malott(2011) wanted her to 
write, but she also, not surprisingly, failed to cite the authors whom he wanted her to 
cite; Malott considers the ―cutting edge contemporary educational Marxists not 
mentioned in her book‖ (p. 2) to include Mike Cole, Dave Hill, Paula Allman,5 and 
Glenn Rikowski (p. 8). He likewise complains that she did not cite the ―critical 
pedagogy‖ authors that he wanted her to cite (p. 5; see Critical Pedagogy section 
below). While Malott acknowledges that Anyon cites Peter McLaren he complains 
that she did not spend enough time discussing hiswork (p. 10). In general he 
complains that Anyon ―draws on almost exclusively American Scholars‖ (pp. 11, 9-
11), despite her citing authors who do have an international perspective, such as 
Antonia Darder and Carlos Torres (Anyon, 2011, p. 3). Of course, Anyon was writing 
a book focused on the influence of U.S.-based Marxist scholars on her own career, 
credited Apple with introducing U.S. scholars to European Marxist scholarship, and, 
therefore, did not focus on international authors. 
The authors that Malott (2011) insists Anyon (2011) should have cited were 
not, for the most part, publishing on educational Marxism during the first period of 
her career in the late 1970s and early 1980s, so we should not expect to find them 
remembered in the parts of her book that correspond to those decades. Peter McLaren, 
for example, though a prominent educational Marxist today, as recently as 1987 was 
highly critical of ―orthodox,‖ ―classical,‖ and ―vulgar‖ Marxism (terms that he used 
interchangeably), for, among other alleged errors, reducing everything to production 
relations (pp. 301-304) and for ―threatening any possible reconciliation of an orthodox 
Marxist theory of ideology with new post-structuralist formulations‖ (p. 302). Much 
of his criticism of Marxism in the article was from a postmodern perspective (not 
even a neo-Marxist perspective), leading him to state that, ―my ‗culturalist‘ position 
asserts that the manufacture of desire can exist relatively independently of the logic of 
the economy‖ (p. 303). During the earlier part of Anyon‘s career, therefore, her theory 
was more informed by Marxism than was McLaren, who was following postmodern 
theory, so we should not expect her to have cited him as an influence. It was during 
the first period of her career that Anyon (1981) was most directly engaged with 
examining and testing Marxist theory. Even then, however, she was drawing upon a 
wider body of literature that would, according to the labels assigned by Malott, make 
her either neo-Marxist or not Marxist at all. So he should not, given his own charges 
against her work, expect her to cite orthodox
6
 Marxists as influences during this 
period. 
By the second period of her career Anyon was applying her theoretical 
perspective (which is largely Marxist but also draws upon a broader body of 
scholarship) to expose the structural nature of poverty and educational failure in urban 
settings in the United States. The approach taken in the second period of her career 
has continued into her recent scholarship as well. The authors that Malott cites as 
ideal type educational Marxists (whom I agree are important voices in Marxist 
scholarship and from whom I have learned a great deal) have largely been concerned 
with discussions related to a close (orthodox or classical) reading of Marx. Anyon‘s 
                                                 
5
 It should be noted, despite Malott‘s attempt to include Allman, McLaren, and Hill in a chorus that 
sings the same Marxist tune as he sings, that Kelsh and Hill (2006) dismiss Allman (2001) as anti-
Marxist for her treatment of property, even as McLaren (2001) praises her for it.  
6
 While the authors that Malott identifies with may prefer to think of themselves as classical Marxists 
(Kelsh & Hill, 2006; McLaren, 2001a; McLaren &Rikowski, 2000), I believe, given the concepts they 
advance, that they are closer to orthodox Marxism (see Lukác, 1968; Althusser, 1971). 
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work has largely been concerned with applying Marxist insights and inspiration to the 
qualitative empirical study of social problems. Thus their work is not the most 
immediately relevant to her discussion of her scholarship. Finally, it must be noted 
that Anyon choosing not to cite these authors does not indicate that she hasn‘t read 
them. 
Anyon‘s (2011) alleged failure to cite the correct authors, according to Malott 
(2011), seems to be related to her having failed to write the book that he wanted her to 
write. As I noted in my review of Marx and Education (McGrew, 2011), the book 
would have been improved, in my view, if Anyon had included a list of suggested 
readings on and by Marx.
7
 Given that this book was written in part as an introductory 
text, however, it is inevitable and appropriate that certain concepts not be addressed in 
the sort of detail one finds in a more focused and advanced discussion of Marx and 
that the number of citations included be truncated as well.  
 
Conform to Our Interpretation of Marx 
In my review of Marx and Education (McGrew, 2011) I suggested that the 
book might have been improved if it had leaned a bit more towards detailed Marxist 
analysis without abandoning the ability to reach a mixed audience. That‘s an opinion. 
Malott (2011) seems to be arguing—as an absolute truth rather than an opinion—that 
any scholarship on Marxism that doesn‘t say the things that he wants said and doesn‘t 
cite the authors whom he wants cited is somehow counter-revolutionary. This 
tendency towards authoritarianism and sectarianism on the Left has historically served 
to undermine the global struggle for a socialist future. As such it must be opposed and 
rooted out. It is this tendency towards dogmatic thinking, so evident in Malott‘s 
(2011) essay, that necessitates my critique continuing beyond what I have discussed 
so far. I will now turn to some of his arguments as to why Anyon is allegedly an 
enemy of Marxism, in order to show that this sort of orthodoxy is both 
counterproductive and ultimately, ironically to be sure, inconsistent with Marx. 
 
The Marxist Litmus Test 
Malott (2011) states that Anyon‘s work ―is as devoid of genuine Marxist 
critique as those who openly denounce Marxism,‖ (p. 2), that she is pseudo-Marxist 
rather than Marxist or neo-Marxist (p. 2), and that she is Weberian (what Malott 
means by calling her this is discussed in the Max Weber section below), reformist, 
and, therefore, ―indirectly pro-capitalist‖ (p. 2). Statements such as these are 
frequently repeated in his essay without providing adequate support for them. When 
what he takes for support is provided it seems to result from misreading what Anyon 
wrote, from misreading the positions of other scholars, or by drawing conclusions 
from what she wrote that are neither logical or consistent. The few potential errors 
that Malott (2011) identifies in Marx and Education (Anyon, 2011) are not used 
simply to argue that those instances are inconsistent with a Marxist perspective but, 
rather, that the entire book is somehow anti-Marxist. Worse still, Malott (2011) argues 
that these potential errors render her entire career anti-Marxist.
8
Finally, and 
problematically, he continually implies that there is a unified body of Marxist scholars 
of which he is a member, the correct Marxism if you will, even though the very 
                                                 
7
 For all we know she may have suggested this and the publisher may have rejected it given page length 
concerns. 
8
 It is not clear whether this sweeping rejection of her entire scholarly career is based on an 
independent reading of her body of work given that Marx and Education (2011) is the only text by 
Anyon that Malott cites in his essay. 
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Marxists he uses for his litmus test do disagree with each other at times and seem to 
frequently disagree with the positions Malott has attributed to them. 
Anyon (2011) fails Malott‘s (2011) litmus test on a number of grounds. He 
claims that she doesn‘t directly engage with Marx‘s work, ―especially Capital‖ (p. 4). 
He makes this claim despite her calling for a resurgence of reading the original works 
of Marx, quoting him, and repeatedly referring to Marxist concepts in such a manner 
as to convey familiarity with his work (Anyon, 2011). Malott (2011) goes on to claim 
that the basic ideas of Marx that Anyon discusses are ―outdated, primordial, and 
misses the central concept of Marx…[quoting McLaren & Jaramillo, 2010] the 
production of value in capitalist society and its effects on the conditions of the human 
race‖ (p. 6).These accusations are refuted by what Anyon actually wrote in Marx and 
Education (2011). For example, she argues that capitalism is for Marx ―an economic 
system based on private ownership of the means of production‖ (p. 7). It is further 
refuted when she defines social class in Marxist terms as ―a person‘s or group‘s 
relation to the means of production‖ (p. 11). The accusation that the Marxist concepts 
that Anyon introduces (see McGrew, 2011) are outdated is undermined by Malott 
(2011) himself arguing for many of these concepts or criticizing Anyonfor allegedly 
failing to address them (Malott, 2011). Many of theses allegedly outdated concepts 
are concepts that the Marxist scholars Malott identifies with argue for themselves 
(Allman, 2001, 2002; Cole, 2008; Hill, McLaren, Cole, & Rikowski, 2002). 
Malott‘s (2011) claim that Anyon fails to grasp the basic concepts in Marx 
may result from his being overly eager to read such failure into any minor errors she 
may have made in word choice: 
 
Anyon‘s analysis of Marx‘s basic concepts misses this point following 
instead the formula that argues that Marx believed that all workers should 
contribute to social reproduction based on their ability and should therefore 
share in the ―profits‖ of their labor based on individual needs. There is a 
problem with this formulation. First and foremost, Marx‘s critique of 
capitalism was not designed to democratize capitalism, an oxymoronic notion 
that demonstrates a complete misunderstanding of Marx‘s theory. Rather, his 
work was a theory against class and therefore against capitalism. The goal is 
not to share ―profits,‖ but to dismantle the process of profit making, as Glenn 
Rikowski and others have made abundantly clear. This requires dismantling 
the basic relationship between labor and capital and the commodification of 
human labor power. (p. 9)  
 
When we look at what Anyon (2011) actually wrote, that: 
 
Capitalism‘s private ownership of production is also distinctive from a 
socialist/communist system as imagined by Marx, in which everyone contributes 
to the production of economic goods according to their ability, and is provided 
profits and goods according to what each person needs. (p. 9) 
 
We see, particularly in the context of the surrounding discussions and keeping in mind 
that she was providing a basic introduction to Marxism, that Malott is reading far too 
much into Anyon‘s use of the terms profits and goods. It is evident from the larger 
conversation in which she was engaging that she understands full well the need to 
replace capitalism with a system not based on the ―profoundly unequal relationship 
between workers/employees and owners‖ (Anyon, 2011, p. 8). Aside from whether, 
debatably, Anyon erred in using these terms, her summation of Marx is correct, and 
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consistent with that provided by McLaren and Rikowski (2001) who describe, 
―Marx‘s concept of ‗from each according to their ability, to each according to their 
need.‘‖  
 
Is Anyon secretly or unknowingly a liberal? 
Malott (2011) similarly takes the following statement by Anyon, that ―Marx 
would have argued that it is not merit by which one advances in capitalist society so 
much as it is because of one‘s social class background and the opportunities (or lack 
thereof) that this background affords,‖ to mean that her ―focus‖ on mobility makes her 
Weberian, rather than Marxist. He then states that Marx would have made different 
arguments related to ―false consciousness‖9 and ideology that prevent ―workers form 
rebelling against the central relationship that negatively binds them to a system of 
exploitation that can only ever promise crisis and ever worsening conditions‖ (p. 9). 
Once again, when we read the surrounding context of Anyon‘s (2011) statement, we 
see that she was describing the same concepts in Marx that Malott faults her for 
allegedly not addressing. For example, preceding the above quoted sentence with the 
mention of mobility, that Malott reads so much into, Anyon stated that, ―In 
capitalism, according to Marx, economic class relations strongly influence the social 
situation outside of the work place… [including] ones‘ political and other ideas and 
views‖ and that ―Marx argued, in this vein, that the economic relation and social 
context in which the working class exists limits the worker‘s ability to transcend her 
or his social situation‖ (p. 9). What Anyon actually wrote describes exactly the 
ideological barriers, generated in the ―mode of production of material life‖ (p. 9), that 
prevent rebellion. 
The accusation that Anyon is essentially liberal or unintentionally against 
Marxism (Malott, 2011) is very similar to the arguments of Strike (1989) and Price 
(1986) who each describe Bowles and Gintis (1976) as embracing a liberal 
perspective that seeks not equal outcomes but fair competition (McGrew, 2011). In 
both cases, like Malott, Price and Strike make their claims based on rather fine points 
of disagreement over how to understand Marx.
10
Unlike Malott in his discussion of 
Anyon‘s work, neither Price nor Strike conclude, given the errors that they believe 
they have found, that the entire project of Bowles and Gintis is somehow anti-
Marxist. Malott‘s (2011) claim that Anyon‘s work, and in particular her early work, is 
not Marxist is contradicted by his describing Bowles and Gintis as the ―most early 
educational Marxists‖ (p. 4). This is a contradiction because Anyon‘s early work 
tested and found empirical evidence supporting the correspondence theory of Bowles 
and Gintis (Anyon, 2011; McGrew, 2011a). In other words, if Bowles and Gintiswere 
Marxist, given that Anyon largely followed their theory, then she was Marxist as 
well.
11
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 It should be noted that Allman (2001), one of the Marxist scholars Malott uses as ideal types for his 
Marxist litmus test, rejects false consciousness as a non-Marxist concept (p.  7). McLaren (1987) had 
also criticized the concept during his postmodern period.  
10
 Though Price and Strike do more to explain their reasoning on these points than Malott has, I find 
their argument no more convincing than his when claiming that Bowles and Gintis have embraced 
liberal goals or methods. 
11
 There seems to be general agreement among Marxist authors, including some of those with whom 
Malott identifies, that Bowles and Gintis are in fact Marxist (Brosio, 1994; Cole, 2008; Hill & Cole, 
2001; Rikowski, 1997; Sarup, 1978; Small, 2005; McLaren, 2008). 
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Are reproduction and correspondence liberal concepts? 
Malott‘s (2011) claims that the focus on social class reproduction is Weberian 
and ―hardly Marxist,‖ and that Anyon ignores the ―root causes of capitalism‖ (p. 4), 
are rather perplexing for several reasons. First, Malott acknowledged that the work of 
Bowles and Gintis is Marxist (p. 4). Given that Schooling in Capitalist America 
(Bowles &Gintis, 1976) was concerned with social reproduction and the 
correspondence principal, this would appear to be another contradiction in logic. 
Because Anyon‘s focus on reproduction and correspondence followed the work of 
Bowles and Gintis so closely in her early career (Anyon, 2011), her conception of 
reproduction must be as Marxist as their focus on the same concept. Second, 
reproduction and correspondence, between the superstructure and base of capitalist 
production, are widely recognized as Marxist concepts (Apple, 1990; Brosio, 1994; 
McGrew, 2008, 2011; Price, 1986; Small, 2005; Strike, 1989). Third, some of the 
very Marxist authors that Malott (2011) uses for his litmus test recognize reproduction 
and correspondence as important Marxist concepts (Allman, 2001; Cole, 1988, 2008; 
Rikowski, 1997). 
 
Did Anyon reject revolution? 
Malott (2011) has attempted to elevate a few brief statements in Marx and 
Education (Anyon, 2011), such as revolution being ―an old fashioned concept‖ (p. 
18), to the level of a rejection of the need to replace capitalism with a planned 
socialist economy, when in reality these comments are not sufficient to support such a 
conclusion (McGrew, 2011). In attempting to support his claim that Anyon has 
abandoned revolution to work within the capitalist system, Malott (2011) quotes from 
a common high school history textbook in the United States in which Karl Marx is 
described as ―extreme‖ for wanting to overthrow the capitalist system (p. 7). He then 
attempts to tie Anyon to this propaganda agenda:  
 
Anyon similarly portrays the overthrow of capitalism as ―extreme‖ or 
undesirable, which she states most clearly noting that, ―‘revolution‘ itself 
appears an old fashioned concept‖ (p. 18). What Anyon seems to be 
consenting here is the notion that capitalist hegemony is inevitable precluding 
any further shifts in paradigm resulting in the current labor/capital 
relationship or abstract labor as permanent allowing social commentators to 
claim the end of history, an idea championed after the 1989 fall of Soviet 
Communism. (p. 7) 
 
The use of ―extreme‖ in quotes suggests that Anyon had used the term in describing 
revolutionary aspirations. The word extreme is used 10 times (in one form or another) 
in Marx and Education (Anyon, 2011) but never as Malott implies here. Other efforts 
by Malott (2011) to bolster his claim that Anyon has rejected revolution rely on 
reading meanings into Anyon‘s statements that are not reasonable given what she 
actually wrote. For example, Malott takes her statement that the work of Marx has 
been used to ―foster social revolution as well as repress it‖ as suggesting that there is 
―something in Marx‘s work that is repressive or authoritarian‖ (p. 6). What Anyon 
(2011) actually wrote, that ―social commentators in various countries have used Marx 
to foster social revolution as well as repress it,‖ (p. 7), along with the context of the 
paragraphs with which it was written, clearly indicate that she was faulting 
commentators and regimes for misusing Marx to undermine revolution rather than his 
work itself. Moreover, her statements here seem consistent with statements made by 
McLaren (2008, p. xi), one of the authors Malott claims to be aligned with. 
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In reality Anyon‘s (2011) statements related to revolution point to little more 
than a need for clarification. It is more likely that she was questioning the idea that 
revolutions always require force (see Cole, 2008; Nyberg, 1965), or the idea that the 
replacement of capitalism must occur suddenly at one swell swoop, than rejecting 
revolutionary change. I say this because she repeatedly makes or supports statements 
that imply the need for revolution (as defined as replacing capitalism). For example, 
she defines socialism as requiring replacing the ―old bourgeois society‖ and social 
class divisions (Anyon, 2011, p. 9); language that is consistent with that used by 
Nyberg (1965) and by Castles & Wüstenberg (1979) when describing the need 
identified by Marx to create a classless society. As another example, Anyon (2011) 
describes, and seems to support, a ―basic‖ idea of Marx that ―class struggle by the 
industrial working class is key to revolutionary transformation‖ (p. 6). She seems to 
embrace the need for revolutionary change when she writes, ―it is this class struggle 
which Marx saw as ultimately leading to the overthrow of capitalism and the possible 
development of socialism and communism – a democratic sharing of resources and 
profits‖ (p. 9). 
 
Revolutionary process 
Malott‘s efforts to this point, believing that he has established that Anyon is 
against revolutionary change, are set up to argue that: 
 
If the goal of Anyon‘s class analysis, like much of the educational left in 
general as documented by McLaren and Jaramillo (2010), is not to overthrow 
capitalism, it must be to reform it, and therefore should not be called Marxist 
or even neo-Marxist, but rather not-Marxist or pseudo-Marxist… (p. 8)  
 
Because his set up consists of faulty arguments and conclusions, this claim is 
undermined. Moreover, his efforts reveal an understanding of revolution that has no 
conception of process. To struggle within the system as an interim stage is not to 
abandon an understanding of the need to transform the capitalist system. Malott 
would probably object to my use here of the word transform instead of overthrow. In 
so objecting he would obsess over a semantic difference where no substantial 
difference exists.  
Marx having argued that the ―struggle in the form of public contestation‖ 
could possibly increase equity from the system (Anyon, 2011, p. 3) indicates an 
understanding of process. Consider the following statements made by Paulo Freire 
(1994): 
 
I think politically, every time we can occupy some position inside of the 
subsystem, we should do so.  But as much as possible, we should try to 
establish good relationships with the experience of people outside the system 
in order to help what we are trying to do inside. (p.203) 
 
By describing working both inside and outside of the system Freire was not 
abandoning the need to replace capitalism but rather was demonstrating an 
understanding of process in a dynamic and evolving situation. Marx described 
commencing ―where we were‖ (Cole, 2008; McGrew, 2011; Padover, 1975) which 
also implies an understanding of the need for interim stages. As Castles and 
Wüstenberg (1979) stated, ―Marxists never envisaged a direct transition from 
capitalism to communism, but have always seen the need for an intermediary state…‖ 
(p. 5). Even the move to socialism in Venezuela, a country that I believe Malott 
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(2011) is correct to hold up as a shining example, resulted from a democratic election 
working within the existing system. The people in Venezuela are still in the process of 
democratically determining the direction that the country should take both socially 
and economically (Cole, 2008, p. 139). Venezuela is not currently and may never be 
an example of the idealized ―pure‖ communism that Malott seems to require. I don‘t 
see that as necessarily being a problem. The point is that Malott would. He measures 
Anyon by his purity test, criticizes her for not praising Venezuela, and yet he ignores 
that much in Venezuela would also fail his purity test.  
 
The Retreat from Class and Marx 
Malott (2011) criticizes Anyon for ignoring the ―retreat from class‖ that he 
claims is associated with U.S. neo-Marxists in the 1970s such as Michael Apple (p. 
12). I argue in my review of Marx and Education (McGrew, 2011) that more 
exploration of the debates around correspondence, reproduction, and resistance, with 
clarification of her position on them, would have been helpful. I have also faulted 
Apple and others for overstating the alleged lack of attention to agency and the 
allegedly overly reductive and deterministic understanding of structure in the work of 
Bowles and Gintis (McGrew, 2008; 2011a). That is far different than claiming that 
Michael Apple, and implying that Jean Anyon, have somehow abandoned class 
analysis. This is a strange claim for Malott to be making given that both Apple (1984; 
1986; 1988; 1993; 2006) and Anyon (1981;1994; 1997; 2005; 2011) have addressed 
the importance of class throughout their careers. A clue as to why Malott (2011) 
would make such a claim is found in the way that he uses the terms class and 
Marxism almost interchangeably (p. 12). What he actually seems to be saying is that 
any class analysis that doesn‘t conform to his understanding of class in Marx 
represents an abandonment of class/ Marxism (p. 2).  
 
Gramsci 
Malott (2011) claims that the neo-Marxist project of demonstrating ―how ideas 
and culture are used by dominant society as tools to reproduce various categories of 
social class preventing social mobility‖ is Weberian rather than Marxist because it is 
not a theory against class or capitalism (p. 3). He makes this claim in response to 
Anyon‘s discussion of ―ideology, cultural capital, hegemony, counter-hegemony, 
selective tradition, and resistance‖ (p. 3). Reading carefully in Marx and Education 
(Anyon, 2011) we find that Anyon was crediting Antonio Gramsci and Michael Apple 
as having introduced her to many of these concepts that Malott considers anti-
Marxist. He is indirectly implying, therefore, that both Gramsci and Apple do not 
challenge capitalism or class-based society and are themselves Weberian.  
Malott‘s sweeping dismissal of neo-Marxism, identifying both Apple and 
Gramsci as representative of it, is not reasonable. Gramsci‘s concept of hegemony 
(Anyon, 2011, p. 13), for example, was a modification of Marx‘s concept of ideology 
to explain the durability of capitalism (pp. 12-13; Allman, 2002); what Strike (1989) 
has described as the problem of the relative stability of capitalism (p. 149) and the 
acquiescence of the majority of the people (p. 150). Hegemony, therefore, is a concept 
that grows out of Marx, to defend Marxism, to explain why revolutions did not occur 
as he expected. Malott‘s implied rejection of Gramsci as somehow against Marxism 
does not seem to be a view shared by most Marxist scholars, including some of those 
with whom he claims allegiance (Allman, 2001, 2002; Cole & Hill, 1995; McLaren, 
2000, 2001; Rikowski, 1996; Sharp, 1980). The concept of cultural capital, likewise, 
is not inconsistent with Marxism (Apple, 1992). And while I have been highly critical 
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of both the resistance theory described by Paul Willis and the resistance theories 
attributed to him (McGrew, 2008, 2011a), there is nothing in the concept of resistance 
that is incompatible with Marxist analysis.   
Apple responded to Malott‘s (2011) accusations in a personal communication 
(September 22, 2011) regarding my plans to critique Malott‘s essay: 
 
I certainly have not led a move to dismiss class relations. Indeed, any careful 
reading of books such as Educating the ―Right‖ Way shows that I am deeply 
committed to continuing class analysis, but that I reject as reductive a 
simplistic two class model. I argue that a particular class fraction-the 
professional and managerial new middle class-has increasing power in 
educational and social policy. In the process I argue that cultural capital plays 
a crucial role in this. I also argue that neoliberals and dominant class fractions 
are given more power through the alliance they have built with the new 
middle class and with other groups. In essence, my project is fundamentally a 
Gramscian one. Why no revolution? What is the creative ideological work at 
the level of common sense that dominant classes (and races) do to change 
common sense and achieve consent? I think that class is essential to this; but 
it does not offer an adequate explanation to the power of racial and 
racializing dynamics.‖12 
 
Malott will likely view Apples‘ identification of his work as influenced by Gramsci as 
further evidence that he has abandoned class and Marxism. It seems that even 
Gramsci, smuggling out his work while imprisoned on orders of Mussolini, may not 
pass Malott‘s litmus test (Malott, 2011, pp. 3, 7). Apple is, of course, quite correct in 
counting Gramsci‘s understanding of hegemony as being Marxist. Apple did not 
reject class or Marx, but, rather, moved away from what he took to be reductive 
notions of reproduction and correspondence. In doing so I believe that he overstated, 
at times, his positions while stereotyping the work of Bowles and Gintis (McGrew, 
2008, 2011a). Refusing to accept that Marx explained everything that had ever been 
and everything that was to come, however, does not amount to an abandonment 
Marxist or class analysis.    
 
Postmodernism 
Because Anyon (2011) does not criticize Apple for allegedly abandoning class 
and Marx, Malott (2011) says that she appears to be ―against Marxism yet calls 
herself a Marxist‖ (p. 12). He quotes Anyon on some of the reasons that there has 
been a move away from Marxist scholarship—reasons consistent with what other 
Marxists have argued (see McGrew, 2011)—yet simultaneously accuses her of 
―downplaying the retreat from class‖ (Malott, 2011, p. 12). In particular, Malott faults 
her for not discussing ―the most comprehensive summary documenting the a retreat 
from class and attack on Marxism, which is arguably Marxism Against 
Postmodernism in Educational Theory by Dave Hill, Peter McLaren, Mike Cole, and 
                                                 
12
 McLaren & Jaramillo (2010) seem to concede Apple‘s argument when they state that, ―classical 
Marxism has helped us to view the class struggle not only as an economic struggle between the 
propertied and propertyless but also as a political struggle directed at the state (and here the hegemonic 
class is created through a system of alliances of class fractions that can best unify the power bloc)… 
The state is not a neutral site; it is not an autonomous region that miraculously floats above the messy 
world of class antagonisms. Here the state is viewed as a site where mechanisms to win consent are 
pivotal, where legitimization is struggled over by competing groups with various social, economic, and 
political interests‖ (p. 257). 
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Glenn Rikowski (2002)‖ (p. 12). Though Anyon (1994) has never been associated 
with postmodernism, Malott now condemns her for not condemning others for 
allegedly embracing the postmodern retreat from class. 
It is ironic that Malott (2011) argues that Apple, and implies that Anyon, have 
abandoned class analysis and Marxism for postmodernism, while citing McLaren as 
one of the authors who has done a better job of opposing this postmodern 
abandonment of class. In 1994 McLaren and Lankshear, in the introduction to The 
Politics of Liberation, endorsed a postmodern notion of oppression that rejects ―grand 
narratives‖ (p. 4) and ―master narratives‖ (p. 10) in our ―postmodern society‖ (p. 4). 
Similarly, McLaren writing with da Silva (1993) argued against ―binary thinking‖ (p. 
80) while seemingly embracing a ―poststructuralist‖ or ―postmodern‖ perspective (pp. 
48, 58-59). Kincheloe and McLaren (2002) argued for a form of postmodernism 
stating that, ―The kind of postmodern social theory we want to pose as a 
counterweight to skeptical and spectral postmodernism has been referred to as 
oppositional postmodernism… (p. 110). McLaren (2001a) admits his postmodern past 
in an interview stating that, ―I can‘t deny that there was a time when postmodern 
thinkers played a central role in my work‖ (p. xlviii). To be fair it should be 
recognized that McLaren‘s relationship to the postmodern has always been 
ambivalent, simultaneously seeking to adopt certain aspects of postmodern and post-
structural theory while searching for a continued basis for struggle (Mclaren, 1997, 
1998). This is quite different from the unambiguous language he has chosen more 
recently, for example, that, ―Postmodernism is an obstacle to the formation of open 
and radical perspectives that challenge inequalities and the deepening of the rule of 
capital in all areas of social life‖ (Rikowski& McLaren, 2002, p. 3). McLaren is 
entitled to change his mind and move towards a more traditional Marxist project, and 
I for one am glad that he has. It would, however, be more accurate to say that 
McLaren had contributed to a postmodern retreat from class than to say that Apple 
had.  
 
Max Weber 
Malott (2011) claims that Anyon‘s work has been Weberian since she first 
began publishing in the 1980s (p. 3). By calling her Weberian, Malott means to 
accuse Anyon of forgetting the inherent conflict between the capitalist class and the 
working class (Bourgeoisie and Proletariat) and therefore, to his way of thinking, of 
having abandoned Marxist class analysis for something merely called class. As he 
states: 
 
Anyon is simply wrong to believe that her work is at all Marxist. Rather, as 
demonstrated below, her work is really grounded in a Weberian-oriented 
sociological analysis of social class and therefore advocates for a reformist, 
and indirectly pro-capitalist approach to change. In other words, just because 
Anyon takes social class as a central unit of analysis does not make her work 
Marxist. (p. 2) 
 
When we look at what Anyon (1981) actually wrote early in her career, however, we 
see that in adopting a more complex understanding of class that she had not 
abandoned the Marxist understanding of class being tied to ones relationship to the 
means of production: 
 
For the purposes of this study, social class is considered as a series of 
relationships to several aspects of the process in society by which goods, 
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services, and culture are produced. That is, while one‘s occupational status 
and income level contribute to one‘s social class, they do not define it. 
Contributing as well are one‘s relationships to the system of ownership of 
physical and cultural capital, to the structure of authority at work and in 
society, and to the content and process of one‘s own activity… One‘s 
relationship to all three of these aspects of production (to the systems of 
ownership and authority, and to work itself) determine one‘s social class. All 
three relationships are necessary and no single one is sufficient for 
determining a relation to the process of production in society. (p. 4) 
 
Despite Weber‘s criticism of Marx (Löwith, 1993), the differences between them may 
have been exaggerated (Mommsen, 1977). Whatever one‘s position on the differences 
between them, to adopt some aspects of Weber‘s theory is not necessarily to abandon 
a Marxist project. On the few occasions that Anyon or Apple discuss Weber, it can 
hardly be argued that they are endorsing his theoretical perspectives against those of 
Marx (Anyon, 1981; Apple, 1986, 2001). Malott‘s (2011) repeated attempts to 
describe Apple and Anyon as advancing Weber over Marx seems to be based on the 
faulty assumption that to draw upon Weber, or otherwise envision multiple class 
groupings operating within the two primary classes, is somehow to reject class/Marx. 
That Malott would attempt to caste them out as enemies of Marxism simply because 
they don‘t adhere to his Marxist dogma is far more revealing than the accusations that 
he has made against them. 
Malott‘s (2011) accusation that Apple has abandoned class seems to follow 
Kelsh& Hill (2006) who argue that Apple has adopted a Weberian notion of class at 
odds with a Marxist understanding of class, as well as Allman, McLaren, & Rikowski 
(2003) and McLaren & Rikowski (2001) who make similar arguments without 
naming names. These authors, unlike Malott in his essay, clearly articulate the reasons 
for their distinction between the Weberian and Marxist concepts of class as well as 
their reasons for criticizing those who do not emphasize a Marxist dichotomy between 
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Despite their arguments being clearly articulated I 
find them no more convincing than Malott when making these claims. 
The criticism of Weberian influenced ―multi-class formations‖ (McLaren 
&Rikowski, 2001), that Malott (2011) seems to be following, is that: 
 
If you say somebody is upper class and then designate somebody else as 
lower class, the assumption is that there is a middle-class and the upshot of 
this classification system is the naturalization of the notion of progress within 
capitalism. All you do is too lend credence to the myth that it is possible for 
everyone to move up the ranks on the basis of hard work, fortitude, and 
perseverance. This justifies the social division of labor and class 
differentiation and mystifies the agonistic relations among the classes. When 
we talk about ‗white collar‘ and ‗blue collar‘ workers, we hide the existence 
of the working class and the fact that this class has common class interests. 
We hinder the development of a common class-consciousness among 
fractions within the working class. I prefer the term ‗ruling class‘ or 
‗capitalist class‘ on the one hand, and ‗working-class‘ on the other. (McLaren 
& Rikowski, 2001) 
 
Similar arguments are made by Allman, McLaren and Rikowski (2003). While one 
could imagine—or actually cite—authors engaging in a multi-class formulation that 
minimizes the class struggle described by Marx, it does not follow therefore that all 
multi-class formulations are either Weberian or that they necessarily ignore the class 
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conflict inherent in the capitalist system. Rather than identifying authors of a liberal 
perspective who do explicitly argue against a Marxist understanding of class as 
related to capitalist production, Kelsh and Hill (2006) try to persuade us that Michael 
Apple is the poster child for the liberal assault on Marx. They assert that Apple‘s 
understanding of the social is ―Weberian-based‖ and that his arguments only have the 
―appearance‖ of being radical because he uses terms like ―class‖ and ―the economic‖ 
and claims ―to be making arguments for social change that involve the 
‗transformation‘ of capitalism.‖  
In attempting to make the case that Apple is Weberian and therefore against 
class/Marx, Kelsh and Hill (2006) repeatedly take out of context and read far too 
much into statements made by Apple. For example, they claim that the ―social 
transformation‖ he is committed to does not include replacing capitalism. When we 
look at what Apple actually wrote in the passage that they are referring to, however, 
we see that he was quoting Willis & Trondman  (2000) and Touraine (2001) in order 
to challenge the idea that capitalism is the only possible system (Apple, 2003, p. 17); 
hardly a position contradictory to Marxism. Kelsh and Hill (2006) go on to claim that 
Apple wants to ―eliminate poverty through greater income parity.‖ When we look at 
this statement in the context in which it appears (Apple, 2001), however, we do not 
find evidence that Apple expects that greater income parity is possible within 
capitalism. In fact, this statement occurred within a criticism of market-based school 
reforms and was immediately preceded by this sentence, ―However, we need to take 
seriously the probability that only by focusing on exogenous socioeconomic features, 
not simply the organizational features, of ―successful‖ schools can all schools 
succeed‖ (p. 81). Of course, Kelsh and Hill (2006) take the very use of the term 
socioeconomic
13as proof that Apple‘s use of class ―is merely descriptive,‖ by which 
they mean not Marxist. Looking at other statements that Apple made in the book 
regarding class and mobility we find him being highly critical of the myth of mobility 
and the idea that class-based inequalities are natural or inevitable (Apple, 2001, p. 21) 
while making statements in defense of class analysis that are clearly informed by 
Marx (p. 203).  
 
The unity of opposites 
Kelsh and Hill (2006) repeatedly quote Apple discussing the inadequacy of a 
binary notion of class—that reduces everything to the economy without considering 
culture, race, and gender—as if these quotes somehow support their faulty conclusion 
that Apple has rejected an understanding of the inherent conflict between the 
proletariat and bourgeoisie. They admit, quoting Apple from an article in 1992, for 
example, that he ―cautions against forgetting class as central to capitalism‖ and as a 
―massive structuring force,‖ but then conclude that, ―Yet class for Apple is 
nevertheless, in his actual practices, an effect of the market, determined not by 
relation to property, but by relations within culture.‖ They quote apple on capitalism 
being, ―not only an economic system but a cultural system as well,‖ and somehow 
conclude, nonetheless, that he has ignored the importance of capitalist relations. They 
insist that Apple is mistaken to assume that the ―Marxist theory of class cannot 
address differences such as those of race and gender‖ but simultaneously insist on 
understanding race, gender, and culture as exclusively products of the production 
process, or, as they put it, ―race is class, gender is class.‖ 
                                                 
13
 It should be noted that as recently as the year 2000 McLaren used the term favorably when 
describing the injustices that Freire opposed (p. 163). 
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This confusion is easily avoided by considering what Apple (1992) wrote in 
the article, which was written to caution against certain readings of Bernstein that 
might ignore the Marxist insights into class, regarding class having two parts: class 
structure and class formation (p. 137). There is simply nothing here to demonstrate—
despite their self assurances that they have so demonstrated—that Apple‘s efforts to 
construct a complex understanding of class, culture, race, and gender contradict the 
Marxist understanding of the inherent conflict between the working class and 
capitalist class; Marx, of course, having suggested the possibility of greater 
complexity than the two primary classes in his discussions of the petite bourgeoisie 
and ideologically informed consciousness (Anyon, 2011). 
Kelsh and Hill (2006) like the other authors whom Malott (2011) seems to be 
following (Allman, McLaren and Rikowski, 2003; McLaren & Rikowski, 2001), 
make great efforts to demonstrate what they take to be the differences between Weber 
and Marx. Even if we accept the distinctions that they make between them, it does not 
follow, and I do not believe that they have made the case, that ―Apple‘s understanding 
of class borrows a great deal from Weber‖ nor that in allegedly doing so that he 
―works, in effect if not in intent, against the interests of the proletariat by blocking its 
ability to see itself as a class, and furthermore, as a class in relation to the capitalist 
class‖ (Kelsh & Hill, 2006). The same accusations leveled against Anyon by Malott 
fail for similar reasons. To put this more plainly, I see no evidence that Apple was 
abandoning the Marxist insight that the Proletariat have interests that are in conflict 
with those of the Bourgeoisie. Rather, he was complicating and adding to that insight.  
Apple was not rejecting a Marxist understanding of class, but was, in a 
perhaps overly softened language, insisting on a theory that reflects the complexity of 
the real world and which understands that not all struggles over education can be 
―reduced to being only about the economy‖ (Apple, 2001, p. 36). Kelsh and Hill 
(2006) recognize that Apple generally ―substitutes‖ terms such as ―proletariat‖ and 
―capitalist class‖ with terms such as ―dominant groups and classes‖ and ―dominant 
economic elites.‖ In doing so he has not, as they claim, erased the material basis of 
class antagonism. Rather, what Apple may be guilty of, for a variety of reasons 
including his desire to hold onto complexity, is having used language that confuses 
both orthodox Marxists—who may only recognize Marxism when they see the 
language that they anticipate—and those not familiar with Marxism—who may fail to 
recognize the centrality of Marxist analysis in his work. As such, more direct 
language that identifies more clearly when Apple is following Marx, modifying Marx, 
or drawing on other influences, might help to minimize confusion. 
It is counterproductive, unnecessary, and illogical to assume diametrical 
incompatibility between Marxism and the positions associated with neo-Marxism, 
particularly in the work of Apple and Anyon. The neo-Marxist approach, after all, 
explores the relative autonomy which may exist within production and the two major 
classes discussed by Marx; a project completely compatible with Marx given his 
discussion of the petite bourgeoisie (Small, 2005, p. 58) and class fractions (Marx & 
Engels, 1964), with relative autonomy being suggested in the distinction between the 
base and the super structure (Sarup, 1978, p. 151; Small, 2005, pp. 63, 98).
14
Even in 
particular instances where the positions articulated in neo-Marxism, or other 
scholarship, appear to be incompatible with orthodox Marxism on the surface we 
should not assume that one or the other must be completely wrong. We might expect 
                                                 
14
 Allman (2001), one of the ideal type Marxists identified by Malott (2011), seems to concede the 
possibility of relative autonomy of social relations, including race and gender (p. 45).  
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Marxists who are used to thinking in terms of internal connections and the unity of 
opposites (Allman, 2001, pp. 6, 40, 47; McLaren, 2001, pp. xiv, xviii) to be more 
flexible. In their implicit unwillingness to allow for the possibility of internal 
connections beyond those specifically described by Marx, these orthodox Marxist 
scholars seem to be insisting that Marx had addressed every possible aspect of 
capitalist society and economy that existed during his lifetime. Moreover, they seem 
to be insisting that Marx had described capitalism as a static system for which history 
had stopped progressing. Of course, such views are not consistent with reality any 
more than they are consistent with the dialectical approach that Marx developed.  
  
Structural arguments are inherently Marxist 
Malott (2011) complains that Anyon leaves the impression that ―the 
educational left has been engaged in neo-marxist work steadily since the 1970s‖ (p. 
12). She would be correct to do so. There has, in fact, been steady neo-Marxist work, 
including work produced in the United States, since the 1960s. This work has 
steadfastly been produced by scholars such as Anyon and Apple despite the general 
move away from Marxism. The decline of Marxist analysis may appear worse than it 
has actually been because critical theory has served as a proxy theory for Marxism 
(Anyon, 2011; McGrew, 2011; Torres, 1999), with authors describing essentially 
Marxist perspectives without identifying as Marxists or even citing Marx. I certainly 
agree that this is problematic (McGrew, 2011). Both Anyon (2011) and I (2008, 2011) 
are arguing for a return to reading Marx, reading the Marxist literature, citing Marx, 
and identifying Marxist analysis as such. But Marxism by another name is still 
Marxism.
15
 
Kelsh and Hill (2006) claim that, ―in the Weberian understanding of class that 
Apple uses, there is no fundamental relation between the fact that Bill Gates has a 
billion dollars while those who produce microchips for Microsoft have only enough 
income on which to survive. What is hidden from view in Apple‘s own uncritical use 
of critical theory is that Bill Gates is a billionaire because so many workers are 
exploited.‖ This claim is not reasonable when considered against Apple‘s body of 
work. In making this faulty claim, however, Kelsh and Hill have conceded that the 
structural analysis of the economy they describe is inherently Marxist. The work of 
neo-Marxists and most critical theorists, whether they openly identify with Marx or 
not, has remained Marxist, knowingly so or not, because the structural analysis 
frequently found in this work is inherently Marxist (Anyon, 2011; Fine, 1991; 
MacLeod, 1995; McGrew, 2008, 2011, 2011a; Weis, 1990; Winn, 2010). Whatever 
else it may be in addition to being Marxist, and though the positions taken on various 
questions may differ from those that Malott and company would favor, this literature 
is at least in part Marxist given the structural perspective. Malott (2011) would not 
agree. Nothing, it seems, counts as Marxism for Malott unless it is explicitly called 
Marxism, shares his exact reading of Marx, includes exactly the conversations he 
believes must be included, and cites exactly the authors whom he believes should be 
cited.   
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 One of Anyon‘s (2011) stated reasons for writing Marx and Education was to show scholars who 
have an understanding of the social context of education the debt that they owe, albeit unknowingly, to 
Marx (pp. 5-6). 
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Critical Pedagogy 
Malott (2011) complains that Anyon doesn‘t cite these ―international Marxist 
critical pedagogy‖ authors: Peter McLaren, Paula Allman, Mike Cole, Dave Hill, Deb 
Kelsh, Ramin Farahmandpur, Gregory Martin, Nathalia Jaramillo, Shahrzad Mojab, 
Himani Bannerji, Basis Bernstein,
16and John Holst, whom he says, ―collectively, 
represents the most cutting edge Marxist educational theory and practice of the past 
three decades‖ (p. 5).17Several of these authors are involved in what appears to be a 
coordinated effort to coopt the critical pedagogy developed by Paulo Freire (2006) 
and replace it with a more didactic approach to teaching orthodox Marxism. They 
generally refer to their approach as some variant of revolutionary critical pedagogy.
18
 
Because they are themselves arguing that their revolutionary pedagogy is different 
than the critical pedagogy that Anyon (2011) is describing, she was under no 
obligation to cite them, regardless of what Malott would have preferred she do.  
 
Is critical pedagogy adequate? 
These authors, following McLaren (2000), repeatedly charge that critical 
pedagogy is either not Marxist enough in its conception or else has been stripped of 
its revolutionary character in practice (pp. 160-166, 185, 192;Martin, 2005; McLaren, 
2008, p. xx; McLaren & Farahmandpur, 2005, pp. 17, 50, 240-241; McLaren & 
Jaramillo, 2010; McLaren, Martin, Farahmandpur, & Jaramillo, 2004).They propose 
their approach as the new, improved, and more revolutionary critical pedagogy. 
McLaren (2000) explains the distinction as follows: 
 
Critical pedagogy constitutes a dialectical and dialogical process that 
instantiates a reciprocal exchange between teachers and students—an 
exchange that engages in the task of reframing, refunctioning, and reposing 
the question of understanding itself, bringing into dialectical relief the 
structural and relational dimensions of knowledge and its hydra-headed 
power/knowledge dimensions. Revolutionary pedagogy goes further still. It 
puts power/knowledge relations on a collision course with their own internal 
contradictions; such a powerful and often unbearable collision gives birth not 
to an epistemological resolution at a higher level but rather to a provisional 
glimpse of a new society freed from the bondage of the past, a vision in 
which the past reverberates in the present, standing at once outside the world 
and beside the world, in a place of insight where the subject recognizes she is 
in a world and subject to it, yet moving through it with the power to name it 
extopically so that hidden meanings can be revealed in the accidental 
contingencies of the everyday. (p. 185)  
 
                                                 
16
 It is questionable whether Bernstein can be counted as either a Marxist theorist or critical pedagogue 
(Michael Apple, personal correspondence, October 2, 2011; Apple, 1992). It should also be noted, 
further contradicting the implied unanimity among the Marxist Scholars that Malott identifies with, that 
Kelsh and Hill (2006) reject Bernstein‘s work for what they take to be his view that ―class is cultural.‖ 
17
 It is not clear if Malott (2011) is criticizing Anyon for not discussing these authors regarding 
Marxism in general or critical pedagogy in particular because he seems use the terms interchangeably 
(pp. 2, 4, 8, 10). 
18
 They alternatively call their approach revolutionary critical pedagogy (Malott, 2011, p. 8; Martin, 
2005; McLaren & Farahmandpur, 2005, p. 241), critical revolutionary pedagogy (McLaren & 
Farahmandpur, 2005, p. 244), radical pedagogy (Malott, 2011, p. 2,McLaren, 2000, p. 34; Martin, 
2005; Holst, 2007), Marxist critical pedagogy (Malott, 2011, p. 5), revolutionary pedagogy (Malott, 
2011, p. 5; McLaren, 2000, p. 34), contraband pedagogy (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 2005, pp. 91-92), 
revolutionary working-class pedagogy (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 2005, p. 178), and socialist 
pedagogy (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 2005, p. 51).  
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This passage actually continues for another seven lines in one sentence, the reading of 
which, while equally entertaining, is not necessary in order to make the following 
observation: McLaren has not described a meaningful difference between Freire‘s 
critical pedagogy and his allegedly more revolutionary critical pedagogy.  
The claim in this passage, from Che Guevara, Paulo Freire, and the Pedagogy 
of Revolution (McLaren, 2000), that a more revolutionary critical pedagogy is needed, 
hinges on the statement that Freire‘s critical pedagogy doesn‘t go far 
enough.
19
Because McLaren alternatively indicates, in the book, that Freire‘s critical 
pedagogy is either itself insufficient (pp. 164-169, 185) or else that it has been 
incorrectly applied by others (pp. 192-193), it is not clear why he believes that critical 
pedagogy should be replaced. Assuming that Freire‘s pedagogy has been 
misunderstood, it does not follow, therefore, that it must be replaced, when, 
presumably, arguing for the correct interpretation could correct the problem. It seems 
more likely that McLaren was arguing that Freire‘s critical pedagogy is itself not 
sufficient, given his claim that it doesn‘t go far enough. In what manner, then, does 
Freire‘s critical pedagogy, according to McLaren, not go far enough?  
 
Is Freire an orthodox Marxist? 
Is Freire not sufficiently Marxist? Despite McLaren hinting that Freire‘s 
theoretical perspective might differ somewhat from more orthodox readings of Marx, 
including the sin of not prioritizing ―class over other categories of oppression,‖ 
(McLaren, 2000, p. 159) he tends, in the book, to essentially credit Marx for much of 
Freire‘s theory. Take as examples his arguing that the ―linchpin‖ of Freire‘s pedagogy 
―is Marx‘s theory of consciousness/praxis‖ (p. 191), his referring to Freire‘s concept 
of praxis by the term revolutionary praxis (p. 192)—the term that Marx used (Small, 
2005, p. 40)—and claiming that, ―Freire‘s approach only makes sense when read in 
the context of Marx‘s negative concept of ideology and the epistemological and 
ontological shifts that his approach requires‖ (McLaren, 2000, p. 193). The tendency 
to read Freire as Marx is also found in more recent work by McLaren & Farhmandpur 
(2005, p. 53), by Allman (2001, pp. 172, 177), and by McLaren & Jaramillo (2010) 
when they state that, ―The use of Marxist theory in the service of radical pedagogy—
or what has come to be known over the last several decades as critical pedagogy‖ (p. 
251). Because they attempt to describe Freire as an orthodox or classical Marxist, 
these authors do not seem, therefore, to be questioning Freire‘s Marxist commitment 
to revolutionary change. 
 
Losing faith in the people 
McLaren (2000) seems to recognize Freire as sufficiently Marxist (p. 159). 
Why then does he argue that Freire‘s critical pedagogy is insufficient? Given that 
Freire was adequately revolutionary and Marxist in his commitments and aims, the 
problem must be at the level of practice. McLaren‘s revolutionary pedagogy appears 
to be aimed at teaching students Marxism. Freire‘s approach would not oppose 
examining Marxism in the classroom so long as it emerged from the students‘ 
investigation of the world and was presented in the correct dialogical spirit (Freire & 
Horton, 1990). Assuming that McLaren understands this, the problem he refers to, 
apparently, then, is not with curriculum. It seems reasonable to conclude, by process 
                                                 
19
 McLaren, despite his argument that Freire‘s critical pedagogy doesn‘t go far enough, also refers on 
occasion to Freire‘s pedagogy as ―revolutionary pedagogy‖ (McLaren, 2000, pp. 187, 191) or uses the 
terms critical pedagogy and revolutionary critical pedagogy interchangeably (McLaren & Jaramillo, 
2010). 
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of elimination,
20
 that what McLaren is actually critical of is the process of 
conscientization that Freire (2006) describes. He is apparently impatient with the 
process and unwilling to risk that students will not come to the questions and 
conclusions that he desires.
21
 
 What McLaren seems to be suggesting is an approach that if not directly 
didactic in its banking, say depositing by lecture, would attempt to conscribe or 
manipulate the conversation so as to arrive at his desired ends, the creation of 
dogmatic Marxists like himself. His allegedly more radical pedagogy appears, from a 
Freirean perspective, to result from having lost faith in the people. As such the 
pedagogy suggested is imposition.
22
 Therefore, it is a form of violence that would 
further castigate the oppressed by seeking to impose the desired revolutionary 
outcome on them, locking them into a relationship of dependence that prevents 
authentic and lasting liberation (see Freire, 2006).  
 
Coopting Freire 
Space does not allow for the redress that this attempt at cooption of the critical 
pedagogy of Paulo Freire deserves. For now I would point out that the authors who 
are advocating for the allegedly more revolutionary critical pedagogy, in addition to 
forgetting the importance of the non-impositional nature of problem-posing dialogue
23
 
that Freire describes, seem to make the mistake of reducing Freire‘s scholarship 
simply to being Marxist (in the image of their dogma).
24
 Though Marx is a significant 
influence in Freire‘s work, his theory combined several traditions that were equally 
important to him. More to the point, Freire‘s concept of oppression described both 
capitalism and more than capitalism. Oppression was not simply, for Freire, another 
word for capitalist and he did not believe that the end of capitalist accumulation (see 
Malott, 2011, p. 13) would eliminate oppression. As I have argued previously, 
Capitalism, for Freire, ―is human greed, expressed in the dehumanization of and 
exploitation of others, manifest in an ideologically driven economic system‖ 
(McGrew, 2008, p. 12). Additionally, Allman (2001) seems to fundamentally misread 
Freire‘s critical pedagogy as requiring students to enter into the dialogical process 
already committed to social transformation (pp. 178, 212), a situation that would, if it 
existed as she imagines, tend to undermine their goal of using revolutionary critical 
pedagogy to create an army of young orthodox (or classical) Marxist revolutionaries.  
I do not believe that McLaren or Allman have made the case that Freire‘s 
critical pedagogy is insufficient or that the pedagogy they propose improves upon it, 
at least not in terms of revolutionary commitments, aims, or curriculum. If it is 
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 This effort to sift out why exactly McLaren makes his distinction between his proposed pedagogical 
approach and Freire‘s pedagogy becomes necessary because McLaren is not very specific, despite 
considerable pontification, as to what exactly he would have his revolutionary teachers do in actual 
classrooms. It is also necessary because of his alternatively distinguishing revolutionary critical 
pedagogy from Freire‘s critical pedagogy, attributing revolutionary critical pedagogy to Freire, or 
using the terms interchangeably.  
21
 This impatience is perhaps hinted at when McLaren (2000) states that, ―In the theater of battle, Che 
did not have time to create the conditions for peasants to achieve conscientization before he tried to 
conscript them into his guerrilla project‖ (p. 188). 
22
 Allman (2001) claims, for example, that all Freirean education is ―prescriptive‖ and ―directive‖ (p. 
205). She misstates Freire‘s position here (see Freire and Horton, 1990). Allman is correct that for 
Freire the educator‘s role was not as mere facilitator but neither was it prescriptive or directive, 
exercising ―authority‖ over students thinking (p. 205).  
23
 I say this given the logical implications of the totality of their arguments, despite Allman (2001) 
mentioning that imposition contradicts the principles of Freire‘s pedagogy (p. 178).   
24
Anyon (2011) may also be too quick to read critical pedagogy in simple Marxist terms (p. 97-98). 
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Freire‘s insistence on non-imposition that they disagree with, let them explain, with 
specific examples at the level of practice, how their approach would be different, and 
let their approach stand on the strengths of their arguments, without attempting to 
coopt Freire‘s approach—and the name critical pedagogy—for an approach that 
contradicts the heart of his pedagogy.
25
 For all the reasons discussed in this section, I 
don‘t make much of Malott‘s (2011) criticism of Anyon for not citing McLaren, and 
the authors who are following him, in his attempts to reinvent (or coopt) critical 
pedagogy. The extension of critical pedagogy that Anyon (2011) describes differs 
significantly from the revolutionary critical pedagogy described by McLaren and 
company. Their pedagogy also has not been an influenced on her thinking on this 
issue, so we should not expect, despite Malott‘s insistence, that she would cite them 
when discussing critical pedagogy. 
 
Revolutionary Praxis 
Malott (2011) states, given the problems that he believes he finds in Marx and 
Education (Anyon, 2011), that if he used her book he ―would not engage the students 
in a passive reading of the text‖ but rather ―would read it actively drawing on the 
voices of educational Marxists not included in the book‖ (Malott, 2011, p. 5). This 
statement provides, I think, a window into the problem with how Malott, and others, 
approach what is at the heart of Marxism, revolutionary praxis. Everything should be 
read in the critical manner in which Malott says he would read Anyon, nothing should 
be read passively, including the original works of Marx. Everything must be open to 
re-examination in light of new evidence, historical developments, and counter 
arguments. Malott seems to understand the need for action—his understanding of 
revolution—and of the need for theory—his dogma—but seems to have forgotten the 
―dialectical feedback loop between action and theory‖ (McGrew, 2011, p. 10). When 
Kelsh and Hill (2006) complain that Apple, ―privileges experiential knowledge over 
theoretical knowledge, and in particular, classical Marxist theory,‖ they seem to make 
the same mistake. True praxis must entertain even the possibility of revising major 
tenants of Marxist thought. This attention to evidence is what makes revolutionary 
praxis scientific (Allman, 2001; Cole, 2008; Harris, 1979; Hook, 1955; Morgan, 2003; 
Nyberg, 1965; Pines, 1993; Price, 1986; Small, 2005). McLaren (2000) concedes this, 
knowingly or not, when he quotes James Petras describing Che Guevera‘s 
understanding of praxis as ―a living reinvention of the Marxist categories of ‗class 
struggle‘ and ‗class politics‘ in a changing context‖ (p. 45). 
Malott (2011), and the Marxists he includes in his vanguard, despite the 
differences between them that he does not address, do share a tendency to read the 
world according to their orthodox understanding of Marx. This tendency probably 
results from a combination of respect for the power of his thought and gratitude for 
what his work has meant for them in their personal journeys to be more fully realized 
human beings. Reading the contemporary economic and social world according to a 
strict adhesion to Marxism (as Marx left it for us in 1883) is problematic, however, 
because it requires ignoring historical developments, areas of Marxist thought that 
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 Freire demonstrated a radical commitment to non-imposition while he was Secretary of Education 
for the São Paolo School System, allowing the staff at each school to vote on whether to participate in 
reforms (Freire, 2003; O‘Cadiz, Wong, & Torres, 1999). I am not convinced that it would be wrong to 
require teachers to adopt a critical pedagogical approach. I nonetheless recognize and respect his 
position. At the level of practice in the classroom, however, I am in complete agreement with this 
commitment. 
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have been developed further than Marx had during his life, and counter evidence that 
qualifies or even undermines some of his positions. In their zeal to prevent the further 
development of Marxism, which they take as betrayal, orthodox followers of Marx 
even resort at times, ironically, to closing the doors that Marx had himself left open 
for these developments. McLaren described this problem in 1987 (before his turn to a 
more orthodox Marxist theoretical orientation): 
 
Regrettably, the traditional sectarian orthodoxy within Marxism threatens to 
foreclose its critical appropriation of new theoretical advances. Of course, 
this observation is hardly new, having been made on numerous occasions, 
most notably perhaps in E. P. Thompson‘s attack on structuralist Marxism in 
The Poverty of Theory…Thompson argues that structuralist Marxism in some 
ways constitutes a version of religious practice; it does not involve a direct 
approach to real problems of understanding the world. Rather than attempting 
to confront social and political events, structuralist Marxism concerns itself 
only with the logical problems of theoretical analysis, working through the 
careful exposition of sacred texts… In a somewhat similar vein, Aronowitz 
writes that ―just as no Christian theologian can deny God no matter how 
revolutionary his/her account of the fate of humans, Marxism is tied to a 
discursive structure in which ideas such as the mode of production, 
mediation, crisis and historical agency possess transhistorical priority.‖ (p. 
311) 
 
This is surely not how Marx would want his present followers approach his work. The 
best way to honor the memory of and continue the work of Marx is, as Freire said of 
his own contribution, to recreate him for new contexts and historical periods (in 
Macedo, 1994, p. xiv).
26
 
When Anyon, Apple, and other critical scholars, point to multiple class 
formations and conflicts within these (Anyon, 2011; Apple, 2001; Domhoff, 1979; 
Mills, 1956), to the relative autonomy of culture, race, and gender (Apple, 1982; 
Ladson-Billings, 1995; Lee, 2005), or to the destabilizing impact of inequality under 
capitalism (Anyon, 2011), they do so, at least in part, in response to evidence. Even 
the mistakes that I have identified related to resistance theory in the critical literature 
(McGrew, 2008, 2011a) result, at least in part, because Apple, and others, were 
attempting to accommodate what they took to be the trustworthy findings of Willis 
(1981). Marx was not afraid of engaging with evidence that might challenge his 
assumptions. He read extensively when formulating his theory and even included 
counter evidence when explaining why he reached his ultimate conclusions (Allman, 
2001, p. 46). If Marx were writing today he would undoubtedly consider the same 
evidence that neo-Marxist scholars have examined as well as the changes in capitalist 
production and technology that have occurred since his death. If Marx were writing 
today I suspect that Malott, and those who share his take on Marx, would be 
compelled to label the living Marx as a neo-Marxist,
27
 if not a Weberian pawn for the 
capitalist class. 
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 In McLaren & Jaramillo (2010) concede, in a manner that seems to contradict McLaren‘s usual 
defense of orthodox (or classical) Marxism as well as that of the authors with whom he and Malott are 
associated, when they state that: ―Bringing Marxist thought into critical pedagogy requires us to 
contemplate both the affordances and limitation of Marx‘s writing and its compatibility with the 
current historical moment‖ (p. 257).  
27
 In fact many of the arguments made and positions taken by Marx are consistent with neo-Marxism, 
and certainly don‘t contradict neo-Marxism as represented in the work of Anyon and Apple. Some of 
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That there have been developments in society and capitalism that Marx did not 
predict is undeniable (Anyon, 2011; Harris, 1982). Marx could not anticipate the 
unprecedented levels of automation that robotics have produced or the ease with 
which both labor and capital can be moved around the globe given the internet and 
similar technology. In short, Marx expected the proletariat to have far more leverage 
over the capitalist class than it has today. Building a socialist future, therefore, may 
not be so straightforward a process as orthodox Marxists would like to believe. 
Moreover, it must be realized that the capitalist class is a class for itself, not simply 
for capitalism. In the absence of capitalism, the ruling elite will, as the Soviet Union 
and Communist China so clearly demonstrate, seek new ways to maintain advantage 
in their addiction to always having more (see Freire, 2006). Greed, exploitation, and 
oppression predate capitalism. Socialism, though representing significant progress, 
will not eliminate them from the human heart. The ―new man,‖ therefore, will not be 
born but must be ever be strived towards.  
 
Conclusion 
In attempting to expose Anyon (2011) as allegedly being a liberal enemy of 
Marxism, Malott (2011) actually exposed his own dogmatic approach to Marxist 
analysis. His attempt to present himself as a member of a unified group of orthodox 
educational Marxists, ignoring the disagreements between them while inaccurately 
attributing positions to them, say as much about his own needs as it does about their 
collective contribution. Though these authors do disagree with each other, and 
frequently have positions that differ from those that Malott mistakenly assigns to 
them, they do share a similar understanding of Marx, and have worked in a 
coordinated manner to advance their perspective (citing each other, co-authoring, and 
publishing in many of the same journals, with some of them serving on the editorial 
board of this journal). While these authors have made an important contribution in 
their efforts to use Marx to explain contemporary education, society, and economy, 
they have also tended to dismiss perspectives that differ from their own and to ignore 
counter evidence. This ―circle of certainty‖ (Freire, 2006) inevitably leads to a 
narrowing of vision, exclusion of those who are not members of their collective, and 
eventually may result in their turning on each other over ever finer points of 
disagreement. It is the offspring of this dogmatic orthodoxy, their sectarian desire, 
shared by Malott, to cast out as enemies of Marxism anyone who deviates from their 
positions, that I am opposing in this critique of Malott‘s essay. 
Throughout this article I have argued that dogmatic approaches to Marxism 
actually contradict the process of praxis by preventing consideration of multiple 
interpretations; differences of interpretation and analysis being not only inevitable but 
also beneficial. I have pointed to instances in the scholarship of Malott (2011), and 
others, where their adhesion to a narrow reading of Marx has led them to incorrectly 
take arguments and concepts that had developed out of Marx, in support of Marx, as 
being against Marxism. I have pointed to examples of the tendency to read everything 
as either conforming or not conforming to the Marxist truth (that they believe they are 
in possession of) causing them to read far too much into phraseology and minor 
errors, absent consideration of context or author‘s intent. I have revealed how this 
urge to purge causes them to either caste out those with whom they differ or else to 
attempt to coopt them if they believe the association would be beneficial. I have 
                                                                                                                                            
the arguments that Malott makes in his effort to dismiss neo-Marxism, therefore, could be seen as 
applying to Marx as well.    
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argued that this divisiveness is unnecessary as even positions that may seem 
contradictory on the surface may be united internally in a manner consistent with 
Marxism.
28
 I have argued that praxis requires a willingness to modify or even reject 
aspects of Marxist theory given emerging evidence and historical developments, 
because the very need for a dialectical approach demonstrates our limited ability to 
grasp reality; a limitation that, having been human, must apply to Marx as well.  
I began this article with a quotation from James Connolly, the Irish 
Republican Socialist revolutionary leader who united various factions of Irish 
nationalism, labor, and socialism, culminating with the Easter Rising of 1916, that 
being brutality put down by the British occupational forces, inspired the Irish 
Revolution (Lloyd, 2003; Morgan, 1988). I selected this particular quote because of 
its practical application of the principle of praxis to building unity among differences 
on the Left as well as his understanding that interpretations and ideas must be kept or 
discarded as they prove useful in struggle.  Connolly did not merely seek to unite 
divergent movements in a temporary alliance of convenience against a common 
enemy. Rather, he recognized the insights in their analysis and respectfully compared 
competing perspectives and approaches in light of the development of events 
(Connolly, 1909, 1910). Connolly, who had been adamantly opposed to armed 
struggle in pursuit of an independent socialist republic, primarily because he saw no 
way of defeating the military might of the British Empire, proved his commitment to 
praxis when he changed his position in response to the onset of the First World War.  
Neo-Marxists such as Anyon and Apple as well as more orthodox Marxists 
such as McLaren and Hill, present reasonable interpretations of the available literature 
and evidence, much of the time at least, in their attempts to read and change the 
world. Neo-Marxists believe that the insights gained from Marxist analysis must be 
joined by the insights they find in other approaches and must be modified given new 
evidence and historical developments. More orthodox Marxists believe that Marx 
provided a reading of the world that predicted and explains current developments in 
capitalism and society. More importantly, they view efforts to treat Marxism as just 
one theoretical tool among many as undermining both the unity in Marxism along 
with the understanding that capitalist production is the primary foe that must be 
defeated. Both perspectives, given that they each emerge from attempts to accurately 
read the world, must be considered. I oppose the tendency in both Marxism and neo-
Marxism to stereotype, unfairly criticize, or otherwise dismiss the whole of the other 
approach.
29
 
In my rejection of efforts to label neo-Marxists as not Marxist at all (Malott, 
2011), it is not my desire to return the favor by silencing our more orthodox 
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 Even discussions of multiple forms of power beyond class power (see Tanabe, 1998), generally 
associated with postmodern theory, are not necessarily contradictory to Marxist class analysis, 
depending on the specific arguments made by given authors.  
29
 I find wisdom in many of the positions associated with neo-Marxism as well as those associated with 
classical and orthodox Marxism. While I often reject positions for which I don‘t see adequate support, 
it is also often the case that seemingly contradictory positions are supportable. I reconcile these 
seemingly contradictory positions within a pragmatic framework (Dewey, 1916/1944; Maxcy, 2003; 
Skrtic, 1991), understanding that differing theories give us different ways to look at social phenomena 
that, collectively, bring us closer to comprehending the complexity that can never be completely 
captured by theory, much less a single theory. Marxism continues to inform my analysis, therefore, 
because it is supported by evidence and because it is useful. From where I sit it appears that authors 
working on both sides of the Marxist continuum often make the same mistake, of attempting to 
construct a singular unified theory, which leads them to reject the perspective provided by the other 
side wholesale.  
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comrades. The close reading of Marx that they engage in is necessary to the larger 
project of determining, in changing contexts, what Marx continues to adequately 
explain and where it might need modification (or even help from perspectives outside 
of Marxism). Neo-Marxism (which includes scholars who identify as such and those 
who engage in Marxist structural analysis without so identifying), therefore, needs 
more classical or orthodox Marxism as a foundation from which to deviate when 
necessary. I believe that the neo-Marxist project of drawing upon a broader array of 
theoretical approaches represents necessary progress. Though more orthodox Marxists 
like Malott may not agree, they should recognize, at a minimum, that their efforts to 
find converts will be hampered by demanding that they immediately accept hook, 
line, and sinker every tenant of their platform. They should recognize that neo-
Marxist scholarship like Anyon‘s Marx and Education (2011) or Apple‘s (1996) 
discussion of international capital, consumerism, and cultural politics being related to 
the demand for cheap French fries, however much they may disagree with them at 
times, provide broad audiences access to structural analysis that will garner nibbles, if 
you will, that will eventually bring converts to their Marxist platform. For this reason, 
if not others, orthodox Marxism needs neo-Marxism as well. 
It is my sincere hope that Malott, McLaren, Hill, Rikowski, Allman, and 
others, will abandon the sectarian urge to purge so that we can engage together in the 
collective project of building a socialist future. I hope they will remember that it was 
not capitalists who exiled Trotsky and that capitalists were probably not those 
responsible for his murder (Morgan, 2003). It is sectarianism in the Left, more than a 
failure to unify under a given platform, or in a given organization, that has plagued 
and undermined efforts on the Left to build a socialist future. It‘s time that we stopped 
making that same mistake. It is not necessary that these more orthodox or classical 
Marxist authors abandon their positions for those that I have advanced in this article 
in order to engage in this larger collective project. They need simply desist from the 
divisive politics of as casting out as enemies those whom, though differing on one or 
many particular positions or concepts in their socialism, have also paid a price for 
identifying as Marxists while fighting battles against capitalist exploitation and 
imperialism. After all, what greater insult can there be than to call a dedicated 
socialist a liberal enemy of Marxism? Neo-Marxist authors should help to bridge the 
gap by more explicitly, rather than in coded language recognizable only to the 
initiated, discussing the Marxist influences on their thinking; Anyon‘s (2011) Marx 
and Education is an attempt to do just that. Neo-Marxists should also acknowledge 
the contribution made by more orthodox Marxists even as they delineate their 
disagreements with them.
30
They need not abandon their neo-Marxist positions in 
order to do so. Recognizing that we are all sincere in our efforts to build a socialist 
future, let us continue to agree and disagree in a spirit of solidarity, knowing that our 
ability to examine all of these differing perspectives is part of the process of 
revolutionary praxis, and leaving it to the development of events to prove which 
position was most useful in a given historical situation. 
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 This is one of the reasons that I (2011) suggested that Anyon should have considered including in 
Marx and Education (2011) a list of Marxist educational scholarship for future reading, including many 
of the authors that Malott identifies with, even though their work was not directly relevant to the task 
she had undertaken. 
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